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The Anthropocene Event in Social Theory: On Ways of Problematizing 
Non-Human Materiality Differently 
 
Anders Blok (Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen – contact: 
abl@soc.ku.dk) & Casper Bruun Jensen (Department of Anthropology, Osaka 
University) 
 
Abstract 
Signaling that ‘humanity’ has radically changed the Earth’s environmental 
parameters, the Anthropocene currently generates debate across the socio-cultural 
sciences. In this context, neo-Marxist and new materialist approaches stand out for 
the way they oblige social theory to catch up with new material realities. We share 
the conviction that the Anthropocene might constitute a genuine event for social 
theory and practice. However, we argue that the search for alternative ways of 
problematizing and 'dramatizing' our eco-political predicament confronts these 
approaches with unresolved issues of scientism and economic totalization. Looking 
for another path, we turn to science and technology studies (STS), and especially 
actor-network theory (ANT). We relay the long-standing focus on nonhuman agency 
characteristic of this field via Isabelle Stengers’ argument that we must “accept" the 
reality of Gaia's intrusion into collective historicity. The challenge posed by Stengers, 
we suggest, requires the development of an art of immanent attention to the politics 
of varied matters as they unfold across diverse ecologies of practice. Extending 
further than the present preoccupations of Euro-American social theory, other areas 
within and across environmental history, activism, and politics offer sites of 
resistance as well as experimentation whose conceptual possibilities and practical 
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efficacies have yet to be explored. Slowing down theory sufficiently to learn from 
these multiple sites, we argue, is the starting point for an approach more adequate to 
the problems posed by the Anthropocene event. 
 
Keywords: Anthropocene; Gaia; new materialism; neo-Marxism; science and 
technology studies (STS)  
 
This is exactly what I fear with the Anthropocene thesis; it proposes a ‘future 
perfect continuous’ tense, which puts theorists into a very agreeable position. 
The mess can now be forgotten, swallowed in a continuity that can be 
theorized in a single shot. Abysmal aporia will flourish, happily confronted by 
theoreticians hunting down shades of anthropocentrism in other 
theoreticians’ writings (Isabelle Stengers, in conversation with Davis & Turpin, 
2013, 178). 
 
Ongoing ecological transformations and disruptions have long been matters of 
concern for the social sciences. In recent years, the Anthropocene has become the 
latest master narrative, operating as a clarion call across the natural and social 
sciences, and into the humanities. The concept places upon ‘humanity’ the burden of 
having radically changed the Earth’s environmental parameters, to the point where 
several ‘tipping points’ may soon be breached with incalculable but likely 
catastrophic consequences for the future of the planet. Little wonder that this 
unprecedented situation has generated massive concern both in- and outside 
academia, along with calls for new modes of analysis as well as ever louder calls for 
urgent action (Castree, 2014).  
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 In social theory, the Anthropocene has given rise to widely divergent 
interpretations and forms of problematization.1 Scholars inspired by eco-Marxism 
criticize the term for failing to address colonial and capitalist histories, proposing to 
speak instead of the 'Capitalocene' (Malm & Hornborg, 2014; Moore, 2015). Others 
insist that the central question raised is how to deal with the unruly forces of the 
earth that now shape ‘geosocial futures’ (Clark & Yusoff, 2017). Underlying this latter 
suggestion, a range of broadly ‘new materialist’ scholarship shares the conviction that 
the Anthropocene obliges socio-cultural analysts to 'catch up' with the nonhuman, 
and incorporate a radically material, possibly ‘inhuman’ (Clark, 2011) world into 
social theory (e.g. Coole & Frost, 2010; Clark, 2014; Wark, 2015; Clark & Yusoff, 
2017). 
Given the significance of anthropogenic climate change it is difficult to 
disagree with the general orientation of such arguments. Indeed, we also think that 
the current situation holds the potential to institute a genuine ‘event’ (Stengers, 
2000)—in the sense that it may come to mark a decisive difference between a ‘before’ 
and an ‘after’—for both the socio-cultural and the natural sciences. To characterize 
this event, we offer a detailed examination of new materialist and eco-Marxist 
approaches to the Anthropocene. We do so because both use the Anthropocene as a 
platform for developing arguments about novel obligations placed upon 
contemporary social theory, which are at once far-reaching and far from innocent.  
Here we identify some unresolved issues. In the name of appreciating material 
agency, new materialist approaches struggle with legacies of scientism. Meanwhile, 
 
1 For a brief overview of the natural-scientific literature on the Anthropocene see (Rockström 
et al., 2009).   
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new eco-Marxist formulations have difficulties letting go of an impulse towards 
economic totalization characteristic of many strands of Marxism.  
Probably due to our position as Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars 
working with actor-network theory (ANT) and related ideas, we are particularly 
attentive to such kinds of problems. On the one hand, ANT’s decade-long attempt to 
specify the conceptual and empirical possibilities of engaging nonhuman agency 
beyond scientism (e.g. Latour 1988, 2000, 2017) troubles the new materialist 
ambition to engage inhuman things in themselves. On the other hand, ANT-informed 
work on the material and pragmatic variability of markets challenges the eco-Marxist 
rendition of capitalism as the one overarching framework for making sense of 
ecological disruption (e.g. Callon 1998; Callon, Millo and Yuval 2007). Rather than 
sweeping these conceptual and methodological issues under the Anthropocene carpet 
and offering another eclectic combination of more or less incongruent ideas—
something that happens with some frequency these days2—we examine the different 
ways in which these approaches 'dramatize' (Stengers 2014) the problem of non-
human materiality. The aim is to get a better handle on how social theorists might 
inhabit the Anthropocene event, including the question of whether the term itself is 
adequate for what it names. 
 In brief, and with a deliberate degree of provocation, we argue that an 
understanding of nonhuman agency informed by ANT entails something like a 
reversal of the interpretation of the relation between the Anthropocene and social 
theory put forth by new materialists and eco-Marxists. The present situation is not 
 
2 The eclectic, and to a significant extent conceptually incongruent, use of social-theoretical 
tropes found in Bonneuil and Fressoz' (2016) The Shock of the Anthropocene is a case in point. 
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one in which socio-cultural studies need to ‘catch up’ with the natural sciences by 
learning to take nonhumans and materialities seriously. On the contrary, it is the 
natural sciences (and, belatedly, various theoretical formations within socio-cultural 
studies) that are finally beginning to catch up with the insight that societies and 
economies are fundamentally shaped by nonhuman agency.3 But our aim is not the 
petty one of vindicating ANT (or STS in general) against new competitors. Instead, we 
use new materialist calls for an intensified interest in material agency and eco-
Marxist endeavors to rethink the relation between economies and ecologies as an 
entry-point for our own 'non-innocent' attempt to problematize the Anthropocene 
event differently. With this in mind, we turn to the figure of Gaia, which, due to the 
work of Isabelle Stengers and Bruno Latour, has recently re-emerged as an 
'intellectually serious' figure for thinking through the implications of anthropogenic 
climate change (see Clarke 2017). 
In contrast with the Anthropocene and its inversion, the Capitalocene, Isabelle 
Stengers’ (2015a, 2015b, 2017) version of Gaia simultaneously highlights that 
humanity is in no position to either control or manage the earth; acknowledges that 
certain people and corporations are the main causes of Gaia’s intrusion; and insists 
that the needed responses must be at once pragmatic and experimental. The 
implication is that, rather than placing the problem of response in the hands of 
scientists, politicians, businesses, or cutting-edge social theorists, it must be 
distributed across a heterogeneous ecology of practices.  
 
3 Before his premature death, the sociologist Ulrich Beck argued that the natural sciences 
were finally catching up with the social sciences via the Anthropocene event. We dedicate the 
point to him.  
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We begin by tracing the trajectories that led new materialists towards the 
Anthropocene, and eco-Marxists towards the Capitalocene. Subsequently, we explore 
the alternative problematization of the eco-political situation made available by 
Stengers’ Gaia. As indicated, we believe that Gaia opens up a more capacious 
‘cosmopolitical’ scenography; one that entails an experimental search for situated 
pathways towards the reinvention of numerous practices, including social theory.  
 
Pathways to matter: The new materialisms 
In the following sections, we examine two influential new materialist and eco-Marxist 
responses to the Anthropocene outlined, respectively, by the geographer Nigel Clark 
(2011, see also 2014, 2017) and the environmental historian Jason Moore (2015). We 
engage these two particular thinkers, since their ways of dramatizing the issues are 
interesting in their own right while also holding exemplary value, and because it is 
important to be specific rather than offering abstract diagnoses. However, we begin 
with some more general observations about new materialism, because its ideas and 
premises have significantly influenced current discussions about the Anthropocene in 
social and cultural theory. 
In their introduction to the edited volume New Materialisms, Diana Coole and 
Samantha Frost argued that an adequately updated social theory entails a “reprisal of 
materialism” that must be “truly radical” (2010, 3). The “contemporary context”, 
including the fact of climate change, they asserted, “demands a theoretical 
rapprochement with material realism” (6) on the basis of new developments in the 
natural sciences. In social and cultural theory, this would mean revisiting “the most 
fundamental questions about the nature of matter and the place of embodied humans 
within a natural world” (6).  
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The authors observed that previous materialist philosophers, including Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud, had also been influenced by natural science (5). In the 21st 
Century, however, the classical Newtonian paradigm that had inspired these thinkers 
has been obviated by newer developments and problems. Thus, a new materialism 
was needed, which would be: “resonant with, and to some extent informed by, 
developments in natural science” (6-7). For Coole and Frost, post-classical physics 
held special promise, since it had shown matter to be “more elusive” than previously 
expected, and to contain “an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference, that 
renders matter active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable” (9).   
Coole and Frost were explicit that the new materialism would not entail an 
uncritical acceptance of scientific facts or theories, since “scientific theories cannot 
simply be imported into philosophy” (13). At the same time, they were equally 
emphatic that: “the tropes and rhythms they [scientific theories] suggest can 
transform theoretical discourses” (13). However, as their discussion turned towards 
the realm of sub-atomic particles and dark matter, the distinction between improper 
theoretical importation and inventive tropic-rhythmic transformation itself began to 
blur and darken.  As they draw the conclusion that Marx and Nietzsche must be 
questioned, revamped or bypassed since they got their physics wrong, it certainly 
appears as if new materialism judges the quality of social science on the basis of 
theories directly imported from natural science.  
An obvious question pertains to what exactly is gained by drawing on new 
scientific insights. Coole and Frost indicate that one crucial benefit is an improved 
understanding of matter, which they describe in terms of excess, relationality and 
difference, and with recognition of its activity, self-regeneration and unpredictability. 
In many ways this list of qualities looks appealing, even if it is rather abstract and 
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vague. Upon closer inspection, however, it quickly becomes evident that each of these 
terms is closely related to concepts that already have extensive histories in socio-
cultural theory. Thus, excess has long been affiliated with George Bataille, difference 
with Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, creativity with Henri Bergson, and 
relationality and unpredictability with nearly all social thought over the last half 
century. In other words, it is not altogether clear what it is the new materialism 
intends to 'radically change.'  
Coole and Frost also made a number of methodological suggestions. Thus, they 
argued that to address climate change and global environmental devastation in socio-
cultural analysis requires sensitivity to the “resilience of matter,” to the “importance 
of bodily experience” as well as to the “myriad interrelated material systems needed 
to sustain citizens” (29). Accordingly, they advocated a “multimodal methodology… 
congruent with multi-tiered ontologies” that “run between different levels of the 
social system and especially between the micro-level or everyday, and the macro-
level or structural” (29).  
At this point, however, another objection to the claim to novelty suggests itself. 
After all, methodologies that move between scales of 'micro' and 'macro' is by no 
means a new idea. More importantly, actor-network theory (e.g. Callon and Latour 
1981), feminist science studies (e.g. Haraway 2016), and anthropological approaches 
(e.g. Tsing 2012) have long challenged the assumption that scales are given. They 
have replaced this classic idea with an analytics that sees scales as emergent effects of 
heterogeneous interactions between humans and nonhumans (e.g. Jensen, 2007). 
Instead of slotting reality into fixed micro-, meso- and macro-scales, each dealing with 
appropriately delineated topics and operating according to their own principles, 
these are studies of how scales are constructed through socio-technical ordering 
This paper (post-print) has been accepted for publication in The Sociological Review. Edited, revised and typeset version 
of this paper will be published in The Sociological Review, vol. 67(6) by Sage, All rights reserved. © Sage, 2019 
 
9 
 
processes.  
As this discussion suggests, despite its welcome insistence on material agency, 
new materialism contains various ambiguities and unresolved tensions, which makes 
it difficult to appraise its (new) capacities for dealing with the kinds of ecological 
transformations indexed by the Anthropocene. The following discussion of the 
geographer Nigel Clark’s Inhuman Nature (2011) allows us to examine this question 
more carefully. 
 
An inhuman nature for Anthropocene social theory? 
Given the focus of the discipline, it is probably not very surprising that the most 
sustained application of new materialist ideas to the Anthropocene has occurred in 
geography. Along with Kathryn Yusoff (e.g. 2013) and others, Nigel Clark has shown 
particular commitment to demonstrate not only that humans now shape geology but 
also that social life is underwritten by geologic agency (Clark, 2014, 2017). Here, we 
focus specifically on his Inhuman Nature, which presents a detailed argument for a 
broad expansion, both speculative and empirical, of the role of the nonhuman in 
social theory.  
To develop this argument, Clark combines elements from new materialism and 
the philosophical approach known as object-oriented ontology. As regards the 
former, Clark (2011, 44) refers to a series of thinkers, including Elizabeth Grosz, Vicki 
Kirby and Myra Hird, all of whom insist that the biological and “inorganic systems 
that sustain life” also enable and ‘provoke’ human culture. Thus, Grosz refers to 
nature as ‘the ground’ out of which life emerges and Kirby wants to reclaim nature 
from those who "would reduce nature or the ground to some kind of cultural-
linguistic effect” (44). Clark complements these ideas with the speculative 
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philosopher Quentin Meilassoux’s (2008) critique of ‘correlationism’, a term used to 
designate any post-Kantian philosophy skeptical of the possibility of reaching ‘things 
in themselves.’  
Similar to Coole and Frost, Clark reassures those who might worry about his use 
of scientific claims:  
 
It is, of course, crucial for social scientists to maintain a critical attitude towards 
the premises, practices and products of the physical sciences. We know this well 
enough by now that it need not be rehearsed at every meeting or reading (xviii) 
Also similar to Coole and Frost, he is explicit that his own  
 
argument depends utterly on the ‘substantive’ findings of the earth sciences and 
on the recent philosophical re-activation of the question of ‘things-in-
themselves’ (xiv)  
 
The re-occurrence of this double gesture, which simultaneously acknowledges and 
side-steps the problem of scientism can be seen as testimony to the real difficulties 
social scientists face as they try to activate material agency. And in Clark’s case, too, it 
is quite hard to see how ‘utter dependence’ on the substantive findings of the earth 
sciences squares with a sustained and critical interrogation of the “premises, 
practices and products of the physical sciences.”  
Clark cites with approval the philosopher Ray Brassier’s claim that “fully 
mind-independent realities"—of plate tectonics, undiscovered oil reserves, the 
accretion of the earth—“are found across multitudes of times, spaces, scales or fields 
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of existence” (48). Yet, if we pause to ask from whence comes the certainty of these 
‘fully mind-independent’ facts about "autonomous, human-independent realities" 
(48), the answer is clearly that they come with the unquestioned authority of 
scientists. It is because the genesis of scientific facts (Fleck, 1979 [1935]) is not subject 
to scrutiny that it becomes possible to conceive of them as fully mind-independent.4   
 One finds in the work of Deleuze and Guattari—a source of inspiration for 
actor-network theory (ANT) as well as strands of new materialism (e.g. Coole and 
Frost, 2010, 9) and Clark’s (2017) recent work on the Anthropocene—quite a 
different approach to scientific concepts. Felix Guattari (1989, 131) wrote that “there 
is an urgent need for us to free ourselves of scientistic references and metaphors: to 
forge new paradigms which are instead ethicoaesthetic in inspiration.” Guattari’s 
point was obviously not that either science or matter does not matter. Instead, he 
highlighted that the creative evolution of different fields and disciplines has to be 
open to divergence. Thus, each practice will have to invent its own situated modes of 
attention and response to ecological transformations. As we highlight later, this is 
also the case for the socio-cultural sciences. 
 
From inhuman nature and (back) to entangled worlds 
Nigel Clark (2011) is sympathetic to Bruno Latour’s long-standing effort to grant 
nonhumans a role in socio-cultural analysis. At the same time, in line with Coole and 
Frost’s demand for a ‘truly radical’ reappraisal of materialism, he is critical of what he 
perceives as ANT’s insufficient radicalness. 
 Constitutively hybrid, Latourian actor-networks are composed of a mixture of 
 
4 See Abrahamson et. al. (2015) for related comments on Jane Bennett’s influential version of 
new materialism. 
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human and nonhuman entities. If one searches for an ultimately inhuman nature this 
becomes a problem, since—as Clark (2011, 37) notes with reference to Graham 
Harman—one can find in Latour only “the most flickering hints of networks devoid of 
human involvement.” Moreover, since ANT insists that to speak of or for others 
implies mediation and translation, “it is hard to imagine how a domain fully 
independent of the human can legitimately receive attention as anything more than 
an abstract possibility” (37). Because actor-networks fail to follow through on the 
“beautiful and profound idea of nonhumans composing fully autonomous worlds of 
their own”, Clark finds them prosaic and “strangely conventional” (213).  
 On this point he distinguishes sharply between Bruno Latour and Isabelle 
Stengers whose work on Gaia is crucial for us in what follows. While Latour is 
described as unable to “concede” the potency of things, and thus ends up a closet 
correlationist, Clark sees Stengers as keenly attentive to the inhuman. Contrary to 
“many of her fellow science studies scholars,”5 he writes (38), “who emphasize the 
human–nonhuman co-construction of climate”, Stengers: 
 
drives home the point that issues of global ecological transformation… 
encourages us to conceive of the planet not just in terms of our own 
interchanges with it, but in and for itself: “Of the Earth, the present subject of our 
scenarios, we can presuppose a single thing: it doesn’t care about the questions 
we ask about it” (Stengers, 2000, 145; cited by Clark, 2011, 38).  
 
 
5 Clark does not identify any of these researchers. Stengers is a philosopher of science rather 
than an STS scholar. 
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In fact, it is unlikely that most STS scholars—certainly those working in the 
tradition of ANT—would disagree. This includes Latour, who began his Irreductions 
(1988, 193) with the following comments: 
 
Things-in-themselves? But they are fine, thank you very much. And how are 
you?… The tree shows what it can do, and as it does so, it discovers what all the 
other forces it welcomed can do. You laugh because I attribute too much 
cunning to it? Because you can fell it in five minutes with a chain saw? But don’t 
laugh too soon… Soon you may have no more fuel for your saw. Then the tree 
with its carboniferous allies may be able to sap your strength. So far it has 
neither lost nor won, for each defines the game and time span in which its gain 
or loss is to be measured. 
 
As this quote suggests, the difference between ANT and Clark’s new materialism is 
hardly found in the latter’s more profound appreciation of nonhuman existence. It 
pertains, rather, to the possibility of gaining a hold on such existence without 
mediation, for example by scientists, their instruments and laboratories. 
 On this point, however, there are important differences. They can be brought 
out by tracing Clark’s (2011, p.38) interpretation of Stengers’ (2000, p.128) 
observation that “[e]verything changes when one leaves the laboratory” as support 
for his notion of an inhuman nature.  
On the one hand, Stengers is indicating that outside the circumscribed space of 
the laboratory, nonhuman forces cannot easily be controlled. On the outside, she 
writes, “one finds friction, wind, the irregularity of soil, and the density of milieus” 
(2000, p.128). Yet, on the other hand, this has little to do with a commitment to ‘fully 
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mind-independent’ things. What Stengers is addressing is rather the impossibility of 
maintaining a strict separation between scientific facts and cultural fictions outside 
the space of the laboratory. As vividly exemplified by ecological controversies, on the 
outside it does indeed become very difficult for scientists to control the situation by 
referring to objective facts. But this means that it becomes correspondingly harder to 
identify any pure and untainted testimony to an inhuman nature.  
 Significantly, Clark neglects to follow Stengers’ paragraph to the end. After 
invoking the wind, friction, and the irregularity of soil, she continues: 
 
And one also finds a world acted on by other actors, pursuing other projects […]. 
With regard to these actors, the scientist conscious of changing milieus could 
ask himself: “Why am I so interesting to them? Where are all the others, who are 
capable of taking into account everything that my laboratory must eliminate in 
order to authorize me to speak?” (2000, p.128) 
 
In the end, then, Stengers’ concern has nothing to do with trying to access a world 
indifferent to the plight of humans. Instead, her problem, similar to Latour’s (e.g. 
2004), is how to extend the scientific event without obliterating all the ‘correlations’ 
that make others—whether humans or nonhumans—act.  
It follows that the problem is not really one of correlation at all. Instead, the 
extension of an event is defined by the capacity of new elements—here scientific 
facts, objects or concerns—to insert themselves in other practices in ways that, by 
modifying existing relations, generates consequential new kinds of interest. 
Equidistant from vindicating the idea of a totally external nature and from submitting 
to human correlations, scientific objects are thus exhibited as gaining or losing 
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existence through processes of mediation and transformation that stretch into varied 
ecologies of practice (Stengers, 2005). Rather than complying with the dictates of 
science, these practices further add to and complicate the question of consequences. 
 In turn, this is why the unfolding planetary event, which Stengers (2015b) 
calls the intrusion of Gaia, is indeterminate—like all events—except by its effects and 
“the problem posed in the future it creates” (Stengers, 2000, p.66). Gaia can be 
identified neither with the Anthropocene nor with the Capitalocene (discussed 
further below), because both, in their different ways, over-determine the situation 
and foreclose the possibility of staging the problem differently. What is at issue is 
elucidation of the varied entanglements of people and diverse earthly powers.  
In appreciation of the event’s indeterminacy, Gaia is measured by the 
multiplicity of its interpretations and effects. Once one leaves the scientific 
laboratory, Stengers thus urges us to ask: where are all the others, capable of taking 
into account what the laboratory itself could not? Today, climate and earth scientists 
are themselves posing such questions—both to socio-cultural scholars and to wider 
publics (see Stengers, 2015a). Indeed, Nigel Clark (2017) has also recently begun to 
ask such questions with reference to earth systems governance (without, in our view, 
taking full consideration of everything entailed by this question).  
 Considering the rhetorical energy spent on differentiating his inhuman 
approach from Latour’s ‘strangely conventional’ analyses, we might expect Clark’s 
own analyses to look altogether different. Like in the case of Coole and Frost, 
however, it turns out to be difficult to show just how, why, and to whom the attention 
to radically inhuman matters should matter. The problem is that, as a social scientist, 
Clark is still obliged to deal with people and their situations.  
After spending many pages demolishing Latour’s residual anthropocentrism—
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“hunting down shades of anthropocentrism,” as Stengers wrote in our introductory 
quote—he eventually turns to Emmanuel Levinas to develop an analysis of sociality 
and hospitality in the wake of environmental catastrophe (193ff). Rather than 
entering the ‘beautiful and profound’ realm of fully autonomous non-human worlds, 
we find ourselves amidst many socio-cultural relations, organizations, politicians, 
scientists and other people who make sense of disaster and respond to it.  
In the end, the notion of inhuman nature functions mainly as a persistent 
reminder that floods, fires, and storms do indeed occur and that they do affect people 
in multiple ways. The insight is important and very difficult to disagree with. It is 
difficult, however, to see this way of problematizing nonhumans in the Anthropocene 
as adding something particularly radical or new to social theory.  
 
Updating Marx for the Capitalocene 
If the central preoccupation of Clark, the geographer, was to activate the earth’s 
geological powers against anthropocentric views that ascribe all agency to people, a 
core interest of resurgent eco-Marxism(s) is to locate ecological transformations in 
the context of capitalist history. 
 Marx himself grew increasingly interested in natural science as he developed a 
theory of the ‘metabolism’ of Man and Nature and the (alienated) labor-induced 
‘metabolic rift’ of capitalist exploitation of natural resources (Wark, 2015). Moreover, 
like much of the Western Marxist canon, eco-Marxism is typically committed to the 
possibility of characterizing the ‘true’, 'underlying', ‘systemic’ or ‘total’ view of Socio-
Natural Reality. In this sense, much eco-Marxism assumes what the philosopher 
Graham Harman (2015) dubs a ‘truth politics’ that, to varying degrees, extends 
scientism from the natural and into the socio-cultural sciences. One case in point is 
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the way the Anthropocene has transformed into the “Capitalocene.” 
 The Capitalocene has been given a range of interpretations by quite a 
heterogeneous group of scholars. The political ecologists Andreas Malm and Alf 
Hornborg (2014) deploy the term as part of a frontal critique of the ‘species concept’ 
of the Anthropocene. By locating agency at the level of the human species, they 
charge, Anthropocene scholarship fails to analyze the ‘vested interests’ of capitalism 
as the historical agent of inequality and exploitation all over the planet. Meanwhile, 
the feminist science studies scholar Donna Haraway (2016) uses the Capitalocene as 
a stepping-stone towards a de-centered call for attending to ‘kinships’ across human 
and non-human worlds.6 Mediating between these positions is the environmental 
historian Jason W. Moore’s highly regarded Capitalism in the Web of Life (2015).  
 In a way, Capitalism in the Web of Life occupies a position resembling that of 
Nigel Clark’s Inhuman Nature, except that its starting point is eco-Marxist rather than 
new materialist. In lieu of Clark's mixture of new materialism and object-oriented 
ontology, Moore seeks a radical undoing of any nostalgic vestiges of Society-Nature 
dualism, which is depicted as preventing earlier forms of (eco-)Marxism from fully 
critiquing present-day environmental crises.  
 In a nutshell, Moore develops an analysis of capitalism as working in and 
through nature, rather than being located on its ‘outside.’ Conceived as a form of 
power-laden ‘environment-making’ (Moore, 2015, p.45ff), this world-ecological 
perspective thinks capital and capitalism beyond Society-Nature dualism through the 
notion of the oikeios, “the creative, historical, and dialectical relation between, and 
also always within, human and extra-human natures” (35). As a ‘multilayered 
 
6 It is a stepping-stone because Haraway develops yet another concept, ‘the Chthulucene’. 
This concept bears family resemblance to Stengers’ Gaia, which holds our attention below. 
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dialectic,’ the oikeios comprises flora and fauna, but also the planet’s manifold 
geological and biospheric processes, as these gets ‘bundled’ up with forms of ‘social’ 
organization. Moore thus sees historical agency as an emergent property of 
“configurations of human activity with the rest of life.” 
 
The question of alterity; or, how to undo economic totalization? 
Reading Capitalism in the Web of Life, it is striking to observe how close Moore’s 
project might have been to what he dismissively characterizes as ‘cultural studies’ 
that “highlight hybrids, assemblages, and networks” (33) (in a word, ANT and its 
relatives). Yet, even as Moore (48) rhetorically asks whether “anyone today seriously 
doubt that diseases, or climates, or plants make history as much as any empire?”, and 
although his answer in some ways resembles those given by Latour, Haraway, 
Stengers or Anna Tsing (2015), his own examination of these more-than-human 
connections proceeds via the Marxist canon.7  
Moore wants to rethink capital as a form of human-and-natural accumulation, 
which has achieved global hegemony since the 16th century due to the accessibility of 
‘cheap nature’—of food, labor-power, energy, and raw materials—for which capital 
always pays too little (119). Latter-day ecological crises, however, signal that capital 
is running out of cheap nature to extract. In the end, therefore, much hinges on the 
conceptual boundary between capital and its ‘outside’, or alterity. But this is where 
things get tricky. As noted, Moore rejects the idea of a pre-capitalist, pristine, or 
unspoiled Nature, emphasizing instead historically and geographically specific 
projects of capitalization, wrought within shifting relations of power. In this analysis, 
 
7 Even so, we agree with McKenzie Wark (2015, 129) that Marxism must be seen “as a 
heterogeneous collection of rhetorics, theories, methods, results.”  
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cheap nature emerges as a dialectics of contingent-but-powerful capitalist strategies 
that run up against their own unforeseen consequences.  
 This conceptual maneuver, however, raises the question of whether it is 
actually possible to conceive of any outside to capitalism, or whether it fully 
encompasses the whole ‘web of life’. The question is important because, as Dipesh 
Chakrabarty (2017) has written in response to his eco-Marxist critics (Malm and 
Hornborg, 2014), the existence of unequal global capitalism in general offers no 
specific conceptual handle on humanity’s long-term ecological overshoot. However, 
even if Capitalism cannot operate as a master concept in the Anthropocene, 
Chakrabarty (2017) insists, this does not mean that it must be replaced with the 
human species as a successor concept. Instead, it is the very idea of master concepts 
that needs to go. Analogously, we suggest that the Anthropocene requires the 
development of concepts and forms of analysis that make it possible to keep very 
heterogeneous empirical settings and forms of conceptualization in simultaneous 
view (a point to which we return in discussing Stengers' Gaia). 
The problem with Capitalism as an encompassing analytical category is well 
exemplified in Moore’s analysis of the spread of and resistance to the ‘cheap nature’ 
of genetically modified crops (GMOs). In Moore's reading (2015, 270ff), GMO crops, 
attendant “super-weeds,” and their intensified agro-chemical “taming cycle” primarily 
demonstrates the speed-up, “time-space compressed” dynamics through which 
increasingly globalized environments, stretching from the United States (US) to the 
global South, become part of “the system.” Moore, however, has little to say about the 
importance of (supra-) nation-state projects and the varied interests and ideologies 
of the US and Europe (e.g. Stengers, 2015b; 2017, 390). Indeed, he dismisses the 
environmental movement in general, indicating that it has basically achieved nothing 
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but a shift of production costs from the global North to the global South (228). With 
this gesture, the fierce contestations over capitalist projects across the global South, 
from justice-oriented social reformers, environmental activists, indigenous groups 
and others (e.g. de la Cadena, 2015) are discarded as ephemeral and more or less 
irrelevant.  
At the same time, Moore assigns to nonhumans the severely circumscribed 
role as ‘reserve energy’ for capital, thus disregarding their agency and unruliness, not 
to mention their unpredictable political effects (e.g. Jensen, 2015). While Moore's 
analyses of agro-industrial projects appear resonant with Anna Tsing’s (2015) more-
than-human ethnography of capitalist frontiers and ruined landscapes, for example, 
he bestows no recognition on the unruliness of non-humans, like bacteria and fungi, 
which Tsing shows to have constantly troubled the strategies of plantation capitalism 
(cf. Stengers, 2017, 388). 
 In short, if the problem with Clark’s new materialism was that no matter how 
hard he tried to evacuate people from inhuman nature they kept slipping in, the 
reverse trouble with Moore’s eco-Marxism is that even as he tries to find ways of 
letting non-human, non-capitalist otherness into his analysis, his analytics 
continuously squeezes it out.  
Even so, Moore’s depiction of capital as a patterned set of historical and 
power-inflected projects that simultaneously de-valorizes nature and exceeds 
capitalist aims is interesting. Among other things, it shares critical intent if not 
conceptual orientation with Stengers’ cosmo-political attempt to resist capitalism’s 
eco-political irresponsibility in the face of Gaia’s intrusion (Stengers, 2015b; see also 
Clarke, 2017, 6ff, and discussion below). The import and stakes of these analyses are 
captured by Haraway (2016, 48) who writes that to think the Anthropocene well: 
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one must surely tell of the networks of sugar, precious metals, plantations, 
indigenous genocides, and slavery, with their labor innovations and relocations 
and recompositions of critters and things sweeping up both human and 
nonhuman workers of all kinds. 
 
The question, therefore, is how to recognize the brutal efficacy of capital while also 
noticing its many gaps and interstices, and while also paying attention to the fragile 
articulation of global capital with all sorts of other political matters, including unruly 
nonhumans. How, we might ask with Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers (2011), 
is it possible to inherit Marx’s pragmatic impulse of anti-capitalist struggle while 
eschewing theoretical tendencies towards economic totalization?  
Taken as a general program for rethinking social theory after the 
Anthropocene event, Moore's world-ecological Marxism seems to us less than fully 
convincing. Among other things, the failure to accord much conceptual and practical 
significance to science, culture, or even politics is troublesome, not least in light of the 
important observation that ‘cheap nature’ may be coming to an end. If anything, 
discourses of the Anthropocene have served to stake out limits for and resistances to 
the spread of capital’s projects, through socio-cultural thinking, activist mobilizations, 
and localized struggles that deserve more attention (e.g. Beck, 1992; Latour, 2004; 
Jensen & Blok, 2013; Jensen, 2015). 
Despite its undeniable innovativeness, Moore’s eco-Marxist approach is thus 
ultimately unable to carry through the important task of thinking the limits and 
vulnerabilities of capital. The very notion of Capitalocene, we sense, signals the 
difficulty of detecting what may be truly novel and radical about our current eco-
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political predicament (see Latour, 2017).  
Accordingly, we feel encouraged to search for supplementary or alternative 
ways of problematizing the Anthropocene event. We initiate this by tracing the 
trajectory of STS and ANT, currently prolonged and recast by Isabelle Stengers 
(2015a), who insists that we “accept the reality of Gaia.” 
 
The Intrusion of Gaia: an alternative scenography 
In our view, the “intellectually serious extra-scientific figures of Gaia” (Clarke, 2017, 
2) forged in these years in part by Bruno Latour (2017)—and intensified and 
redirected, in important ways, by Isabelle Stengers (2015a, 2015b, 2017) and by 
Deborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2017)—offer particularly 
promising ways of coming to terms with current eco-political events.8 Among these, 
Stengers’ work stands out for the radical challenge it poses to a social theory bent on 
fully addressing these realities; challenges which, we affirm, also push back both at 
established ANT conventions and at Latour's kindred take on the geo-politics of Gaia.9 
 The crux of Stengers’ (2015a) cosmo-political proposition for the present 
times is that, in the face of multiple environmental crises, we must come to ‘accept’ 
the reality of Gaia both intellectually and politically. What meaning does this 
proposition hold? A term of multiple origins, Gaia was a primordial deity in Greek 
mythology long before it was adopted in the 1960s by the chemist James Lovelock 
 
8 One important manifestation of this wider set of dialogues was the September 2014 Rio de 
Janeiro colloquium on The Thousand Names of Gaia. Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway 
presented, and Stengers’ contribution was central to the discussions. See Danowski and 
Viveiros de Castro (2017). 
 
9 Space prevents us from exploring these overlaps and differences. See Clarke (2017) for a 
useful first step. Suffice to say that, in our reading, Stengers' attention to tropes of intrusion 
and resistance gives to her Gaia a poignant 'cosmo-political' urgency not as readily detectable 
in Latour. 
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and the microbiologist Lynn Margulis to name the hypothesis of Earth as a complex, 
self-regulating system (see Clarke, 2017). As Stengers notes (2015a, 134), however, 
the term has since been re-incarnated in many guises, including in New Age 
mysticism and non-mainstream climate science, making it a “bastard child of climate 
sciences and ancient paganism.” Far from being compromised by this legacy, 
however, Stengers sees Gaia’s constitutive hybridity and indeterminacy as generative 
of its conceptual potential, since it protects the term from being captured by master 
tropes of any kind—scientistic, capitalist, or otherwise. The effect is to leave open the 
question of what exactly current events entail, placed among a multiplicity of 
divergent-yet-potentially-allied practices, as they attune, each in their different way, 
to the problematics of Gaia. 
Signifying neither the conventional figure of Nature or the Earth, Stengers’ 
Gaia is rather the name for a new, ominous being with its own regime of activity and 
sensitivity. At once hyper-responsive to (some) human actions, and unpredictable in 
response, she refers to Gaia as ‘ticklish’ (2015b, 47). Unfortunately, even as these 
‘ticklish’ reactions may well prove deadly to humankind, Gaia is also ‘indifferent’ to 
our concerns. Contrary to theaters of political adjudication, where people have a 
chance to justify their actions, accepting the reality of Gaia means accepting that we 
are now living in a realm of non-negotiable yet largely indeterminate demands, and 
that if we fail to respond adequately, our cries will not be heard.  
This is why Stengers (2015b) defines Gaia as an ‘intrusion’ into collective 
historicity, to which everyone, social theorists included, will have to learn to respond. 
Stengers figures the response in terms of a cosmo-political ‘slowing down’ of 
reasoning, which has multiple implications for how socio-cultural analysis might seek 
to inherit and transform the Anthropocene event.  
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Given Gaia’s indifference to human pleas, it is indeed possible to speak of an 
asymmetric relation to a new ‘ground’, of the kind that held Clark’s (2011, 2014) 
attention. For Stengers, however, Gaia does not designate a set of inhuman materials 
forming autonomous worlds. Quite differently, it operates as a speculative concept 
constructed to induce new appetites for thinking and acting among entangled 
practices. Noticeably, therefore, Stengers’ key questions concern what accepting the 
reality of Gaia would mean for and demand from us (an 'us' that includes social 
theorists). At the same time, however, she insists that Gaia’s demands must now be 
assumed to be a permanent feature of the world. Humans, therefore, will be 
answerable to Gaia for good. Accordingly, Gaia names an unprecedented form of 
‘mundane’ transcendence (Clarke, 2017, 7), deprived of any guarantees. In this 
precise sense, Gaia’s intrusion into historicity marks an irreversible event.  
 According to Stengers (2015b, 44ff), Gaia’s hybrid genealogy is particularly 
useful because it obliges social theorists to scrutinize shifts inside and outside the 
natural sciences with equal care. What this underscores is the importance of 
simultaneously analyzing the transformations Gaia undergoes in the hands of 
different scientific disciplines and in the broader ecology of economic, political and 
cultural practices, across widely divergent settings. Making clear that there is no 
given hierarchy between scientific and other forms of knowledge, Stengers (ibid.) 
argues that Gaia offers a way of resisting “the temptation of brutally opposing the 
sciences against the reputedly ‘nonscientific’ knowledges.” At issue, instead, is the 
“necessity of inventing” new ways of ‘coupling’ divergent forms of knowledge and 
practice. 
Accordingly, Gaia’s intrusion signifies a situation of radically indeterminate 
socio-natural practice, inquiry and politics. Importantly, this is not the uncertainty 
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beloved by climate skeptics, since Gaia in its present state was produced by 
anthropogenic climate change. Instead, it is an indeterminacy that infiltrates science, 
culture, politics, economics and civic action at the level of practice, as no one can 
legitimately claim to know beyond any doubt how to adequately respond. Since socio-
cultural scholars are in no better position than their natural science colleagues to 
claim an extant position from which to capture the total implications of Gaia, a social 
theory troubled by its intrusion requires a far-reaching reconsideration of inherited 
concepts and modes of research.  
By resituating ‘capitalist sorcery’ within a non-totalized scenography of 
forgotten legacies, collective resistances, mutual learning and civic experiments in 
living differently, Pignarre and Stengers (2011) have taken steps towards such a 
reconstruction. Similarly, Stengers (2015b) has re-described the European GMO 
resistance as a process that forged new alliances among concerned scientists, 
environmental activists and capable lay publics. These examples are indicative of the 
kinds of knowledge-making and civic-political learning processes now needed in 
response to the incapacities and cynicism of technocratic political elites. 
In this novel situation, Stengers (2015b) thus insists on the importance of 
social-theoretical experimentation, understood as an ongoing effort to learn from 
other interested and inventive actors how to collectively resist the probability of a 
“coming barbarism.” She calls for a situated and non-foundational practice of socio-
cultural inquiry that would take into consideration, and be responsive to, a range of 
divergent but allied knowledges and practices: natural-scientific, activist-public and 
otherwise.  
 Since the 1960s, environmental history, activism, and politics across all 
continents have generated a wealth of novel practices, the conceptual importance and 
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pragmatic efficacy of which is partly exhibited, yet far from exhausted, in social 
theory (see Jensen, 2015). Should trees have legal standing? (Stone, 1972). Might 
Earth-beings be ascribed constitutional rights? (de la Cadena, 2015). Can Japanese 
Shinto practices re-enchant the capacities of nonhumans? (Jensen & Blok, 2013). How 
to care for and live respectfully in a more-than-human world of charismatic animals 
(Blok, 2011) and travelling, sprawling fungi (Tsing, 2015)? Can Gaia help break the 
long legacy of Euro-centrism in social theory, making it sensitive to other histories? 
(Danowski and Viveiros de Castro, 2017). Obviously, the questions raised are legion 
and no ready-made answers are lying around. Precisely: they are waiting to be 
invented and given conceptual shape by creative scholars in the socio-cultural 
sciences in conjunction with heterogeneous practitioners everywhere. 
 Addressing such questions therefore depends on a genuine willingness to put 
inherited socio-theoretical certainties at risk. This entails a reconfiguration of social 
theory in the image of what Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 372f) called the ‘following 
sciences’, defined by a focus on empirical and conceptual variations and singularities 
and by locating natural and socio-cultural research in the world, and operating 
alongside a multiplicity of other co-inquirers (Jensen, 2012; Savransky, 2016). Were 
such a reconfiguration to succeed—unlikely as it seems—the Anthropocene might 
indeed become a re-generative event for social theory.  
 
Conclusion: Experimenting with matters in social theory 
After the Anthropocene event, it seems clearer than ever that “theory is always a 
detour on the way to something more important” (Stuart Hall, quoted in Wark, 2015, 
7). Yet determining which kind of detour Anthropocene theory is going to be and 
where it is going to lead, depends on what one makes of theory and of its many 
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entanglements. Hall’s statement must then be complemented with Donna Haraway’s 
(2016, 12) insistence that “[i]t matters what matters we use to think other matters 
with.”  
As we have seen, the Anthropocene has given rise to calls for new approaches 
to social theory, and also to some claims to have already delivered them, not least by 
way of refiguring nonhuman agency and lively matter. It is probably not coincidental 
that the rush to create new theory for the Anthropocene, and the “agreeable position” 
in which, according to Isabelle Stengers, this demand places the theorists, has led to 
the elision of already existing ones. This is not to say that ANT, or STS in general, 
provides any off-the-shelf solution either. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of STS to the 
problems of scientism and economic totalization is helpful in opening up the socio-
cultural sciences to alternative ways of engaging the Anthropocene event. We have 
suggested that Stengers’ dramatization of the problem in terms of accepting the 
reality of Gaia’s intrusion offers a particularly fruitful extension of this legacy—one 
that entails a serious rethinking not only of the notion of the Anthropocene but also of 
its mirror image, the Capitalocene. 
 Taking this intrusion seriously, we suggest, requires the development of an art 
of immanent attention to the politics of varied matters as they unfold across the 
whole ecology of practices. Well beyond the present preoccupations of Euro-
American social theory, environmental history, activism and politics are all full of 
sites of resistance and experimentation, the political potentials and conceptual 
capacities of which are far from exhausted. Slowing down theory sufficiently to learn 
from these multiple sites is the starting point for an approach adequate to the 
problems posed by the Anthropocene event, and an irritable, ticklish Gaia.  
 Inasmuch as it matters for social theory to continue to learn to expand its 
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modes of attentiveness to nonhuman materialities, one can certainly do worse than 
detour through the new materialists and eco-Marxists. However, any adequate 
responses to Gaia’s intrusion must be based on an equally firm commitment to 
following, learning to be affected by, and experimenting with the many divergent 
knowledges and practices of natural science, environmental activism, and concerned 
publics currently emerging around the planet.  
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